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World
An anthropological examination (part 1)
João de Pina-Cabral, University of Kent
Anthropologists often take recourse to the word “world” as if its meaning were self-
evident, but the word remains highly ambivalent, often extending its meaning in a 
perilously polysemic fashion. So, the question of “what world are we engaging?” imposes 
itself, particularly as it leads to another important question: are there “worlds”? This latter 
question raises some of the fundamental perplexities that have haunted anthropological 
theory throughout the past century. In this series of two articles, I propose to abandon the 
established dichotomy between rather crude forms of realism and equally crude forms of 
semiotic idealism. I sustain that we cannot discuss world without considering for whom, 
but that this is fully compatible with single-world ontology if we take into account the role 
of personhood in the human condition. This first article argues for a single-world ontology 
and for the centrality of personhood. It explores the implications of a form of minimal 
realism that best suits the ethnographic gesture, while the second article responds to the 
question of world-forming, the matter of worldview.
Keywords: world, ontology, worldview, representation, intentionality, monism.
Anthropologists, historians, and qualitative sociologists often take recourse to the 
word “world” as if its meaning were self-evident. While, indeed, it might be argued 
that the broad enterprise of science is nothing but a study of “world,” the word 
remains highly ambivalent, often extending its meaning in a perilously polysemic 
fashion in the course of any single debate. When we describe some feature of the 
“world of the Nyakyusa” (Wilson 1951), which differs from that of other peoples, 
the meaning of the word is rather distant from that given to it by philosophers 
when they speak of “world-involving sentient activity” (Hutto and Myin 2013: 
157); when we oppose “home” to “world” (Jackson 1995); or yet when we talk of 
“social world,” as Bourdieu so often did (e.g., 1991). How do these meanings com-
bine? Is “world” still a useful category for anthropologists?
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Of late, as it happens, the category has been playing a rather crucial role in 
anthropological debates. Tim Ingold, for instance, predicates one of his seminal 
arguments with the statement, “people do not import their ideas, plans or mental 
representations into the world, since the very world . . . is the homeland of their 
thoughts” (1995: 76, 57–80). Here, we can assume that Ingold means by “world” 
something akin to Martin Heidegger’s “the manifestness of beings as such as a 
whole” (1995: 304), in short, everything that there is. So, the meaning of the word 
would differ from a more socially localized one, as in “the world of the Nyakyusa.” 
And yet, that leaves out the main perplexity posed by Ingold’s sentence: there being 
many ways of deciding what there is, which one should his reader adopt?
These perplexities have haunted the social sciences for a very long time. Twen-
tieth-century anthropologists ranged from those who espoused more or less unso-
phisticated forms of realism to those who adopted semiotic idealisms. On the one 
hand, for example, Max Gluckman’s positivism or Marvin Harris’ materialism; on 
the other, the kind of idealism that Boon and Schneider argued for in the 1970s 
when they proposed “liberating” kinship as a “cultural semantic field” from “so-
ciofunctional prerequisites” granting it “an autonomous integrity analyzable in its 
own right” (Boon and Schneider 1974: 814). There is a dichotomic propensity at 
work in anthropological theory that makes it somehow safer to adopt either one or 
the other extreme. In mid-century England, this was largely represented by Evans-
Pritchard’s radical rejection of the Durkheimian positivism of his predecessors 
in his 1949 Marrett Lecture (1950) and was long instanced in the Oxford versus 
Cambridge divide. But the dichotomic propensity continued: once again, in the 
1980s American postmodernist interpretativism reengaged it and then again, in 
the 2000s, perspectivism brought back the issue all over again.
Over the decades, as I proceeded with my own ethnographic projects,1 I could 
not help but feel that we had to overcome this propensity, as it was both intellec-
tually reductive and ethically unviable. In this series of two articles I attempt to 
articulate the structure of the concept of world as it is being used in contemporary 
anthropological debates (cf. Frankfurt 2009: 2). I propose a view concerning world 
that aims at overcoming the effects of the all-or-nothing fallacy that so often domi-
nates anthropological theorization, that is, “the fallacy of reasoning from the fact 
that there is nothing we might not be wrong about to the conclusion that we might 
be wrong about everything” (Davidson 2001: 45).
My inquiry in these articles is different from Martin Heidegger’s question in 
his famous lecture course of 1929/30 (1995): “what is world?” My purpose differs 
in that I aim to lay out the conditions of possibility for the ethnographic gesture. I 
do not ask about the essence of world or its entities, but about “the world which is 
present at hand” to the ethnographer, as Heidegger would have put it. Thus, I do 
not ask “why world?” but “what world are we engaging?”—that world that is per-
manently a component of all anthropological debate. In these two articles, I will not 
run through the ethnographic record in order to establish exhaustively how differ-
ent anthropologists have defined world. Two examples that call forth very diverse 
terrains will have to suffice. Rather, I attempt to propose an outlook on world that 
1. See www.pina-cabral.org for a review of these projects.
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allows both for the universalist hopes of the anthropological endeavor and for the 
particularistic demands of the ethnographic practice.
Again, I concern myself with the world of humans, but this does not mean that I 
discard or reduce the significance of what Heidegger calls “the comparative exami-
nation” (1995: 176–78). In fact, his three theses that a stone has no world, that an 
animal is poor in world, and that a human is world-forming, help us focus on an 
important aspect of some of the debates that have been firing the social sciences and 
humanities of late. In the wake of Bruno Latour, there are many who question not 
only that humans are the only world-forming agents but also that stones have no 
world. Vital materialists, such as Jane Bennett (2010), argue convincingly in favor 
of the need “to undo the conceit that humanity is the sole or ultimate well-spring 
of agency” (2010: 30). Similarly, William Connolly sustains that we live in an “im-
manent world of becoming” and thus he decries what he calls “the anthropic excep-
tion,” that is, the “radical break between humanity and other processes” (2011: 31).
I agree broadly with these thinkers but I still find that Heidegger’s theses—while 
they cannot be taken on board today in the way they were phrased—do outline three 
broad conditions of differentiation before the world that impose themselves. I find it 
impossible to follow Jane Bennett’s diktat that we must “bracket the question of the 
human” (2010: ix) for that is precisely what anthropology cannot do. It is hardly a 
matter of “placing humans at the ontological centre or hierarchical apex” (Bennett 
2010: 11) but it is a matter of understanding the specific characteristics of the human 
condition. To do that we have to engage with the nature of personhood, since only 
human persons can engage in propositional thinking and, therefore, address the 
world as world. Ours is not a generic human condition, it is the condition of histori-
cally specific persons in ontogeny. World is not only human but it is personal. This 
calls us to be attentive to the “ambivalent character of the concept of world,” the step 
from which Heidegger starts his questioning (1995: 177ff). That is also, therefore, 
the essential point of departure to what follows. Much like him, I do not aim to abol-
ish such ambivalence, I just aim to contribute toward its further unveiling.
A minimalist realism
Of late, anthropological theory has been oscillating between two alternative op-
tions concerning world-making. There are those who follow a metaphysical path 
in proposing to reenchant the world, with all of the rhetoric charm that goes with 
such excesses (Viveiros de Castro 2009; Kohn 2013); there are others, however, 
such as myself, who have opted to stick to the more pedestrian path of building 
a scientific analysis of what is to be human in the world, for which you have to 
assume that all humans share common paths of humanity and of animality, and 
that only within these paths does it make sense to be a social scientist at all. Social 
analysis is carried out by persons in ontogeny, and it is to be received by persons 
in ontogeny. Verisimilitude, therefore, is an indispensable feature of all success-
ful sociological or anthropological description, as any social scientist who has had 
to defend a PhD thesis well knows. And verisimilitude depends on assuming the 
background of a common human world. This approach is, no doubt, less exciting 
from a rhetoric point of view because it obliges us to the constant exercise of critical 
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attention implied in the fact that we are always part of what we observe and that 
there are insuperable limits to certainty.
As such, I aim to contribute toward developing a realism that is minimalist to 
the extent that it sees humans as capable of engaging the world in very diverse 
manners (cf. Lynch 1998). Humans are part of the world and respond to its be-
coming like the members of other species but they do so in a particular way.2 Like 
many animals, we too can only make meaning in a social way, but unlike them 
we develop propositional (symbolic) thinking. This means that we are capable of 
contemplating our position vis-à-vis the world. Yet we do so only in as much as we 
develop personhood (cf. Hutto 2008; Pina-Cabral 2013a). 
I agree, therefore, that we cannot discuss world without considering “for whom.” 
But, contrary to the belief of those who succumb to the all-or-nothing fallacy, this 
minimal realist position is perfectly compatible with a single-world ontology based 
on a nonrepresentational approach to cognition of the kind espoused by Donald 
Davidson in his late writings, where he develops further his notion of “anomalous 
monism” inspired by Spinoza’s thought (cf. Davidson 2005: 295–314). Anthropolo-
gists would do well to play greater attention to Davidson’s interpretivist rereading 
of W. V. Quine’s critique of understanding, for it provides a ready escape route to 
many of the quandaries concerning mind, knowledge, and belief that have haunted 
anthropological theory since Evans-Pritchard’s days and that were brought to a 
skeptical paroxysm in Rodney Needham’s Belief, language, and experience (1972).
Essentially, Davidson’s view is that “there are no strictly law-like correlations 
between phenomena classified as mental and phenomena classified as physical, 
though mental entities are identical, taken one at a time, with physical entities. In 
other words, there is a single ontology, but more than one way of describing and ex-
plaining the items in the ontology” (2004: 121, my emphasis). Taken at its broadest 
implications, this “anomaly,” to use Davidson’s clumsy expression, is not exclusive 
to humans but its effects are potentiated by human propositional (symbolic) think-
ing. Again, we must steer off our propensity to indulge in the all-or-nothing fallacy: 
humans are not only social, they are also persons who can appreciate that their 
own selves are part of the world—to that extent they are world-forming. Thus, for 
a minimalist realist, the relation between personhood and world is fundamental.
For some, like Connolly, this emphasis on the anomaly is incorrect: “The line 
between agency and cause is historically linked to Cartesian and Kantian contrasts 
between human beings invested with the powers of free will and non-human force-
fields susceptible to explanation through nonagentic causes. But the powers of 
self-organization expressed to varying degrees in open systems of different types 
translate that first disjunction into a matter of degree” (Connolly 2011: 173). One 
is bound to agree with him concerning intentional forms of thinking, which hu-
mans share with other species, but not concerning the possibility to conceive of the 
person as separate from the world, which is a function of propositional, human-
specific thinking (cf. Hutto and Myin 2013).
2. Cf. Davidson: “It may be that not even plants could survive in our world if they did not 
to some extent react in ways we find similar to events and objects that we find similar. 
This clearly is true of animals; and of course it becomes more obvious the more like us 
the animal is” (2001: 202).
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I believe that, from such a perspective, we can bypass the all-or-nothing fallacy 
and the dichotomic propensity of anthropological epistemology, which ontologist 
idealism again rehashes (e.g., Holbraad 2010) and develop the bases for a truly 
ecumenist anthropological theory, that is, one that works toward a common anthro-
pological field of debate, one which all humans can access should they so desire.
The word
Today, the more general acceptation of the word “world,” is “what exists,” that is, ev-
erything. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, however, the main reference 
is to the planet Earth. The etymological root of the word lies in the Old English 
word woruld, meaning “human existence, the affairs of life”; itself derived from the 
Proto-Germanic *weraldiz, a combination of the words for “man,” (*veraz; related 
to Latin vir) and “age” (*aldiz, meaning age, generation), thus, implying “the age of 
man.” Furthermore, it would seem that both the Latin mundus and the Greek kos-
mos bore etymologically connotations of order, cleanliness, and neatness.
It is important to realize that the etymological connotations we have just briefly 
outlined have not lost their relevance. For example, when people claim that the 
most pressing problem of our time is humanity’s relation to a world that can no 
longer be taken as infinitely robust and inexhaustible, what meaning are they plac-
ing on the word? In this context, the limited meaning of planet Earth is not suf-
ficient by any means but the meaning “all that exists” is also not the point. On the 
other hand, the further implications that emerge from the etymology, concerning 
humanity’s dwelling place and an ordered context for human habitation, are decid-
edly at stake. There are lessons to be learned from the word’s polysemy and, as we 
will see in this article, it will eventually turn out to be impossible to cast it aside.
However, due to the importance of the legacy of Christianity in the development 
of the scientific tradition in Western Europe, the word has absorbed into itself the 
theory of man’s fallen condition. As such, the world—that which presently exists—
has come to be opposed to that which is to come: Christ’s second coming. This 
range of meanings is condensed in the notion of mundane; a notion that conjoins 
in a millenarian fashion two very separate but metonymically related meanings: (a) 
the everyday humdrum existence and (b) that which is not divine, spiritual, heav-
enly, and is therefore assumed to be shallow, false, doubtful, even irregular (as when, 
in French, a prostitute is called une mondaine). The conjoining of the two carries 
within itself a world-denying implication that facilitates the dualist strains in Euro-
pean thinking (anthropology included) and is best represented by Descartes’ radi-
cal philosophical restart—his cogito ergo sum declaration—that is so fundamental 
to the development of the modern scientific tradition. A somewhat different type 
of dualism concerning the deception of the senses also plays a central role in the 
Buddhist traditions and has remained globally very influential. In fact, historically, 
it constituted a major source of tension with China’s Confucian tradition, which is 
probably the least world-denying of the major philosophical traditions.
Therefore, for contemporary anthropologists, after the profound epistemo-
logical changes that took place in mid-twentieth-century philosophy, the best way 
of going about discovering what is world, is surely to see how it presents itself in 
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people’s historically situated lives. Note, I did not say, “what meaning the word 
has for the people we study,” as anthropologists are prone to put it, for that is only 
part of the issue. I am, therefore, performing a little slide in meaning that I believe 
I should not silence. If I agree with Davidson and the late Wittgenstein that trian-
gulation with the world is an indispensible component of all acts of human com-
munication, then my suggestion that we should research world cannot be limited 
to the collecting of the meanings of the word “world,” the category “world,” or even 
less the belief “world.” I argue that world exists and is immanent (in the sense of im-
posing itself, cf. Connolly 2011), so world is anterior to language and is a condition 
for it, both ontogenetically and phylogenetically.3 Thus, “the accessibility of beings” 
(cf. Heidegger 1995: 269) is an intrinsic condition of all human communication, 
including when the latter deals with world, such as our present communication.
We are bound to cast aside the dualist suspicions concerning the world’s reality 
that characterized both the Christian and the Buddhist traditions, and which were 
based on a systematic distrust of the senses, for they were victims of the all-or-
nothing fallacy. So, we follow Davidson in claiming that, “If words and thoughts 
are, in the most basic cases, necessarily about the sorts of objects and events that 
commonly cause them, there is no room for Cartesian doubts about the indepen-
dent existence of such objects and events” (2001: 45). If, in this way, we reject the 
duality between scheme and content (which we will discuss in the latter part of this 
article), then all our communication is based on an always-anterior existence of 
world.4 Therefore, inspired by Hannah Arendt (1958: 233), we must make an effort 
never to abstract from history: irreversibility and unpredictability are constitutive 
aspects of the human condition in this world of becoming.
Person and world
For an anthropologist, to study the varied ways in which humans inhabit the world 
(the ways they are “at home in the world”) is to study the particular conditions of 
our humanity. So, when anthropologists focus on cohabiting, we are speaking of 
specific human persons who encounter each other jointly in spaces that are com-
mon to the extent that they are historically specific, that is, spaces that carry a 
history of sociality within which the particular ontogenesis of each participant of 
the company was shaped. 5 There is no sociality without persons; we are pressed to 
avoid the twentieth-century proneness to consider sociality in an abstracted way, as 
something that exists beyond personhood (in terms of the species or of groupness). 
Furthermore, embodiment as persons is a condition for all sociality. As George 
3. Cf. Ingold: “History is but the continuation of an evolutionary process by another 
name” (1995: 77).
4. Cf. Davidson: “We do not first form concepts and then discover what they apply to; 
rather, in the basic cases, the application determines the content of the concept” (2001: 
196).
5. I find Ingold’s “dwelling perspective” an interesting formulation of what may be in-
volved here (1995: 75–77).
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Lakoff and Mark Johnson have argued for category formation (1999), and Rodney 
Needham discovered for duality (1987), our own body experience (of containment 
and of handedness, respectively) is constitutive of our most basic mental processes.
Moreover, inhabiting the world as humans is not only to be of the world or to 
be directed at the world, as in the philosophical meaning of the word intentionality. 
For humans, inhabiting the world is confronting the world formatively, in the sense 
of thinking propositionally. I take recourse here to the distinction that Daniel Hutto 
sets up between intentional thinking, which humans share with other species (“ba-
sic mind”), and propositional thinking in language, which is specific to humans 
(“scaffolded mind”).6 Humans inhabit the world in both intentional and proposi-
tional ways. That means that humans as persons are in permanent ontogenesis, that 
is, they work reflexively at the fabrication of their own singularity. But note that I 
am not limiting propositional thought to the boundaries of “conscious/linguistic” 
thinking, an error that has persecuted anthropological theory since the days of 
Marcel Mauss. The world feeds back our ontogenetic actions in ways that we had 
not foreseen—the notion of “scaffolding of mind” is, in this way, usefully evocative.
Two important corollaries can be taken from this: first, we are subject to the in-
determinacy of interpretation, that is, no meaning will ever be fixed or permanently 
determinable; second, we are subject to underdetermination, that is, there will nev-
er be certainty in knowing. This is what Davidson meant when he claimed that he 
was a “monist” (there is one single ontology) but that his monism was “anomalous,” 
for the world will ever remain indeterminate and underdetermined, that is, it will 
remain historically diverse.
The person is born as a member of the human species but is not born fully hu-
man, as it is only in the course of ontogenesis that the person enters into humanity. 
We are neurologically equipped with a propensity to enter the world of human 
communication and to remain within it through memory (Pina-Cabral 2013b). But 
in order to enter into the world of human communication (to acquire a scaffolded 
mind), we have to be enticed into humanity by other humans who had already 
been enticed by others before them, and so on and so forth back to the gradual and 
discrete origins of the human species.
As Daniel Hutto has argued, “nonverbal responding, quite generally, only in-
volves the having of intentional—but not propositional—attitudes” (2008: xiii). This 
is something that remains as part of us for our whole lives. But, over that, through 
the immersion in the complex communicational environments of early ontogeny 
and the relations of mutuality through which carers capture and are captured by 
children (dwelling in company), young humans develop propositional thinking. 
The central propositional attitudes of belief and desire can only be acquired by par-
ticipating in what Hutto calls “unscripted conversational exchanges” (2008: 136). It 
6. Cf. Hutto and Myin: “The very possibility of conceptual meaning, even in the case 
of phenomenality, requires an inter-subjective space. Acknowledging this entails no 
denial of the existence of nonconceptual, noncontentful experiences with phenomenal 
properties associated with basic minds. . . . Our facility with concepts about such ex-
periences is parasitic on a more basic literacy in making ordinary claims about public, 
worldly items. . . . The acquisition of such conceptual abilities depends on being able to 
have and share basic experiences with others” (2013: 173).
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is by participating in complex communicational contexts where viewpoints clash 
and where we are subject to a series of diverse unscripted narratives and explana-
tions (in short, company), that we are driven away from infant solipsism.
In his foundational lecture on the category of the person, Marcel Mauss noted 
that there never has been “a tribe, a language, where the word ‘I—me’ . . . has not 
existed and has failed to express a clearly delineated thing. . . . Apart from the pro-
nouns that languages possess, a great number of them are marked by the usage of 
numberless positional suffixes which reflect in broad terms the relations that exist 
in time and space between the speaking subject and the object of which he/she 
speaks” (1938: 264). While this is true, it must also not be forgotten that pronouns 
do not all function in the same way. Long ago, Émile Benveniste demonstrated 
that the first person and the second person pronouns operate differently from the 
third person pronoun (he/she) in that they are “empty,” as he put it: “their role is 
to provide the instrument for a conversion . . . of language into speech” (1966: 
254). While I and you are positional indicators, he/she are substitutes for objects of 
speech (as in, “Peter ate the apple. He loved it.”). I and you are positional, they do 
not demand a reference external to the speech act; to the contrary, he/she stand for 
something that is external to it.
There is, indeed, a profound truth to this observation, for it has implications 
in the matter of early personal ontogenesis. We must not assume that there is any 
anteriority to the first or second persons, for if we did we would be falling into the 
trap of separating language use (speech) from the historical process of the constitu-
tion of the speaking person, both in ontogeny and in phylogeny. We have to un-
derstand that the “substitution” that the third person operates, to use Benveniste’s 
terms, is the original process that allows for the constitution of the other two: as 
we have come to know, subjectivity follows on intersubjectivity, not the other way 
round (see Trevarthen 1980).
There would be no speech acts if there were no persons to position themselves 
within them. The third person, in some sense (a very Freudian sense, as it turns 
out), is the door into language because it is his/her presence that leads the person 
into selfhood. For there to be a first person ego there has to have been a previous 
process of differentiation, an ego relatedness. People are called into language from 
the outside, so the third person is a previous requirement for the use of the other 
two persons and their respective personal pronouns (cf. Butler 2012). Thus, each 
human being starts his or her personal ontogenesis—his or her path of being—in-
side human contagion. We discover our own personal singularity from within in-
tersubjectivity—and this is why the very word “intersubjectivity” is equivocal, since 
it seems to suggest that subjectivity would be anterior to it, which is not the case.
Singularity and partibility coexist in the human condition, mutually creating 
and destroying each other (Strathern 1988: 11–14). Meyer Fortes has famously 
demonstrated that for the Tallensi, it is only after death that a man can fully achieve 
the status of full personhood ([1973] 1987). As it happens, there is a profound 
universalist validity to that particular aporia, since it highlights that personhood 
is a variable, even in contexts where it is not presented as such. As a matter of 
fact, in the course of personal ontogenesis, each one of us will never be more than 
an “almost-one,” that is, singular but only almost so, because indeterminacy and 
underdetermination are inescapable conditions of propositional thinking. We can 
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only think to the extent that we are willing to enter into sociality and that is a 
communicational process that has to happen in a historically specific location, in 
a world of becoming. The very idea that it may be possible to inhabit the world 
in solitude is ludicrous—as Davidson famously put it, “the possibility of thought 
comes with company” (2001: 88).
As it happens, this is something that my own ethnography of personal naming 
among secondary school children in Bahia (NE Brazil) strongly confirmed, provid-
ing to me an entry into the study of the scaffolding of mind. Children assumed their 
personal names, played with them, and manipulated them (by means of small ad-
aptations and recontextualisations, erasures, hypocoristics, diminutives, etc. [Pina-
Cabral 2013a]). All this happened, however, in a context where their namers and 
primary carers were present (or had absented themselves with significant implica-
tions) and engaged in processes of personal surrogation with them—that is, rela-
tions of profound affective mutuality (Pina-Cabral 2013b). The perspectival foci 
that structured the child’s world—self, home, family, nation—emerged from a game 
of triangulations within an embodied world where new affordances were constant-
ly offering themselves. The children were assessing these within frames that were 
provided to them by the narrative contexts in which they were immersed, as they 
learned more about the world and interacted in ever widening circles. Their docil-
ity toward the adoption of these frames (together with the hegemonic relations they 
carried) was a condition for their own coming into personhood. Deep historical 
recurrences (going way beyond anything the children themselves could consciously 
formulate) combined with shallow local specificities; engagement with the world at 
large combined with a deeply felt sense of local closure. They could only revolt (and 
that they did) to the extent that they had already entered into sociality.
At home in the world
If we want to explore what world can be to humans, then, perhaps the best starting 
point is to choose an ethnographic study by an anthropologist who has set out to 
examine just that. My surprise is that since the days of Lévy-Bruhl so few philoso-
phers have chosen to avail themselves of this rich lode of evidence. Out of a number 
of possible examples, I have chosen to focus on Michael Jackson’s phenomenologi-
cally inspired study of the Warlpiri Aboriginal people of Australia (1995). Called 
At home in the world, the book is an attempt to theorize the concept of “home” by 
overcoming the obvious and much-noted sedentarist implications that the con-
cept carries in most contemporary scientific thinking, and that owes a lot to the 
long-term history of Western Europe (Pina-Cabral 1989). As Jackson puts it in the 
synopsis of his book, “ours is an era of uprootedness, with fewer and fewer people 
living out their lives where they are born. At such a time, in such a world, what does 
it mean to be ‘at home’?” (1995, back page). In fact, as he proceeds to explore the 
ways in which the Warlpiri produce and inhabit what we might choose to call their 
“home,” he is forced to give us a varied and increasingly complex set of suggestions 
concerning what world is, both to him and to them.
After all, it is not possible to debate “home” without placing it in “world” for two 
main reasons: one is that home is that which is not world; the other is that home is 
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perhaps the central feature of any person’s world. These two contrasting meanings 
actually constitute boundary markers for a complex continuum of contexts where 
the word “world” seems to most of us to come in handy. I insist on this latter aspect, 
because in fact I believe that Jackson does make a convincing job of it in his book. 
Furthermore, his insights can be available both to most trained anthropologists 
and to the Warlpiri themselves, with whom he debated the book before publishing 
it. His study, therefore, is not out of history; it is very much part of what world is 
becoming. Much like myself when I worked in coastal Bahia (2012: chap. 9) and 
like most anthropologists these days, there are no sharp linguistic barriers between 
Jackson and his subjects. Yes, there are profound linguistic differences that Jackson 
does indeed explore, but both he and the Warlpiri had a significant take on each 
other’s linguistic universes anterior to their actual (historical) encounter.
I want to use this ethnographic example to show how there are subtle veins 
of meaning that go from one usage of “world” to another, both creating semantic 
overlap and inducing difference. They lead us from one aspect to the other, much 
like a salesman who wants to sell us a car goes through the various aspects of the 
vehicle without ever losing touch of the notion that this is the vehicle that we must 
want (not just this kind of wheel, or this kind of motor, or this kind of paint, etc.).
So Jackson tells us that “I had learned that for the Warlpiri, as for other Aborigi-
nal people, the world was originally lifeless and featureless. It had been given form, 
instilled with life, and charged with meaning by totemic ancestors” (1995: 57). Here 
we meet up with the old paradox of the world-before-the-world: if for the Warlpiri 
such a world had no meaning, was it world? For the purposes of the present discus-
sion, however, the more relevant aspect is the further question: what is at stake for 
the Warlpiri when the notion of “world” is used so generically? In this case, from 
the context, we can assume that Jackson’s sentence refers to what we might call a 
cosmos, an environment that embraces humans and reaches beyond their existence. 
And yet we know that the Warlpiri are aware that there are places in the world 
where there are no Warlpiri-kind totemic ancestors, so it is legitimate to ask them: 
who formed the world of non-Warlpiri peoples? In short, a universalist meaning 
of world (the cosmos) and a localized meaning (a specifically sociocultural mean-
ing, as in “the world of the Nyakyusa”) are somehow made to merge as a result of 
Jackson’s ethnographic mediation, both for him and for the Warlpiri.
A few pages earlier, musing about his African experiences among the Kuranko 
of Sierra Leone, Jackson had told us, “I wondered if any person is ever free to begin 
anew, to walk out into the world as if for the first time” (1995: 51). Of course, the 
answer to his question turns out to be negative because all persons are rooted in 
anteriority and there is no exit from history. But for our present purposes, there 
is a noteworthy difference between this world and the one of the earlier sentence. 
Here, “world” is the opposite of “home”; it is the contrasting outside that accounts 
for the presence of self and home and whose manifestation is the planet Earth and 
the bodies within it, in their material diversity.
In this case, the “world” in the earlier sense of cosmos is made up of world 
plus home. In short, another set of meanings emerges that assumes that world is 
fundamentally perspectival: this second vector of world results from postulating a 
perspectival “home” or “self ” that opposes it. Such a meaning is inscribed in our 
historically acquired proclivities as anthropologists, due to the role that the notion 
2014 | Hau: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 4 (1): 49–73
59 World
of mundanity plays in Christian theology. But there is a case for arguing that home 
and person are constants of human experience: as Godfrey Lienhardt argued, “one 
can lay too much one-sided stress on the collectivist orientation of African ideas 
of the person. . . . The recognition of the importance of an inner, mysterious indi-
vidual activity, comparable to what is meant by speaking in English of ‘what goes 
on inside’ a person is attested by many proverbs” (Lienhardt 1985: 145). I chose 
this example because of Lienhardt’s emphasis on “mysterious”—on the evanescent 
nature of the perspectival center. This meets up with the way Jackson proceeds: “At 
that moment, sitting there with Zack and Nugget, Pincher and Francine [his part-
ner], I think I knew what it means to be at home in the world. It is to experience a 
complete consonance between one’s own body and the body of the earth. Between 
self and other. It little matters whether the other is a landscape, a loved one, a house, 
or an action. Things flow. There seems to be no resistance between oneself and the 
world. The relationship is all” (1995: 110).
As he experiences a merging of embodiment and propositional thinking, 
Jackson is forced to qualify world by reference to “the body of the earth” and this is 
no passing matter, since the groundedness of being is precisely what he is trying to 
get at in this passage. Person/home are now integrally and materially part of world 
and this implies cosmic universality again: “In shared bodily needs, in patterns of 
attachment and loss, in the imperatives of reciprocity, in the habitus of the planet, 
we [that is, all humans] are involved in a common heritage” (1995: 118).
In the wake of Merleau-Ponty, he comes to see that the very possibility of an-
thropology and ethnography is dependent on this “habitus of the planet,” not con-
trary to it. “The possibility of anthropology is born when the other recognizes my 
humanity, and on the strength of this recognition incorporates me into his world, 
giving me food and shelter, bestowing upon me a name, placing upon me the same 
obligations he places upon his own kinsmen and neighbors. I am literally incor-
porated in his world, and it is on the basis of this incorporation and my reciprocal 
response to it that I begin to gain a knowledge of that world. Anthropology should 
never forget that its project unfolds within the universal constraints of hospitality” 
(Jackson 1995: 119).
There could be no better ethnographic instantiation of what lies behind David-
son’s principle of “interpretive charity.”7 And this is why I am surprised that philos-
ophers have not given enough attention to the insights derived from ethnography. 
Anthropology can go beyond the limits of speculation to point to the actual em-
pirical conditions under which humans produce meaning. Note the way in which 
Jackson lays out in this sentence the central paths for the possibility of the ethno-
graphic gesture: food, shelter, name, relatedness. Personhood, both in its physical 
(food, shelter) and its social specificity (name, relatedness) is a boundary condition 
for world and it is universal in its diversity. So a third vector of meaning of world 
appears to emerge: one that opposes the visceral groundedness of personhood to 
7. The principle of charity “directs the interpreter to translate or interpret so as to read 
some of his own standards of truth into the patterns of sentences held true by the 
speaker. The point of the principle is to make the speaker intelligible, since too great 
deviations from consistency and correctness leave no common ground on which to 
judge either conformity or difference” (Davidson 2001: 148).
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propositional thinking (within language). This conjoining is the quandary that In-
gold tries to address in the sentence I quoted earlier: “people do not import their 
ideas, plans or mental representations into the world, since the very world . . . is the 
homeland of their thoughts.”
In Jackson’s engagement with the Warlpiri, then, we witness the various impli-
cations of world coming together in a set of three principal vectors of opposition: 
(i) the cosmic vector—the universally embracing cosmos as opposed to the locally 
conceived culturally-constructed worlds; (ii) the perspectival vector—the encom-
passing world as opposed to the central but evanescent reference point of home or 
self; (iii) the propositional vector—the world as embodied materiality as opposed to 
propositional thinking.
These three vectors of world manifest themselves in formally distinct manners: 
(i) wider and vaguer levels of cosmic embracement operate as contexts for more 
locally defined and more clearly structured worlds; (ii) world encompasses self, 
home, or heimat in such a way as these perspectival positionings both contrast with 
it and are a constituent part of it; (iii) materiality contains our sense of internal exis-
tence (our “arena of presence and action,” cf. Johnston 2010) in that it constrains it, 
preventing its spreading and situating it (see also Lakoff and Johnson’s [1999] no-
tion of bodily containment).8 Embracement, encompassment, and containment are 
distinct but related processes, and in everyday experience the three vectors of world 
combine in a process of becoming through which world constantly unfurls and 
multiplies. It is a movement of (i) totality versus singularity; (ii) encompassment 
versus identification; (iii) exteriority versus interiority, which never stops being 
vaguely aporic because totality, encompassment, and exteriority never disappear 
before singularity, identification, and interiority. Even as world becomes worlds, 
world remains.
Thus, for example, in a sentence like the following by Glenn Bowman writing 
about Jerusalem as a pilgrimage site, we see the three vectors evolving in such a 
way that world unfolds into a number of worlds while remaining present as world, 
in as much as it is the condition of possibility both for the distinct pilgrimages and 
for the author’s ethnographic study of them: “The centrality of the [Biblical] text 
meant that it was the reference point by which religious Christians judged the world 
through which they moved, but the proliferation of meanings accreted around it as 
it variously developed through the historical spread of the Christian faith, meant 
that the worlds constituted in its terms were very different—even when, as in the 
case of Holy Land pilgrimages, those worlds were nominally the same” (1991: 100). 
Other pilgrims too go around those very same streets and react to the very same 
texts. The sharing of a space and a text imposes itself on the pilgrim at the very 
moment they are postulating a divergent perspective from pilgrims of other kinds. 
8. With hindsight, I can see in this distinction an echo of Heidegger’s three moments of 
occurrence of the Dasein: “(1) holding the binding character of things towards us; (2) 
completion; (3) unveiling the being of beings” (1995: 348). However, it will be nothing 
more than a loose correspondence, as I feel that our contemporary discovery that there 
can be intentionality and phenomenal experience that does not involve mental con-
tent—representation—may come to alter significantly all of our earlier understandings 
of being-in-the-world (Hutto and Myin 2013).
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The evidence of the embracing world challenges the completeness of the job of 
ethnic or religious identification. Alterity9 remains irreducible and identification 
incomplete.
At this point we must be reminded of Davidson’s injunction that there can only 
be communication between two speakers when they can triangulate it with the 
world, that is, the “habitus of the planet” is a condition of possibility for humans to 
mutually understand each other (both at the level of person-to-person understand-
ing and at the level of culture-to-culture understanding) but it is also what divides 
us. Confronted with the desert’s unresponsiveness to human presence Jackson ex-
perienced a moment of doubt: “In the desert, I had become convinced that it is not 
in the nature of human consciousness to enter the world of nature. The truth of 
nature does not participate in the truth of human consciousness” (1995: 116). The 
reference to the desert here is not a passing one; it is essential to what he is telling 
us that the desert is a specific environment that shapes human experience. In this 
momentary confrontation with the desert, the reduction of mind to “conscious-
ness” again calls our attention to the unresolved, aporic aspect of the third vector 
identified above: human mind (propositional, reflexive mind) and world interpen-
etrate without ever fully meeting, that is the major implication for anthropology of 
the theory of the indeterminacy of interpretation (Feleppa 1988). Humans are of 
the world but they confront the world. “Some balance must be possible between the 
world into which we are thrown without our asking and the world we imagine we 
might bring into being by dint of what we say and do” (Jackson 1995: 123). This is 
what Jackson calls “the existential struggle” and it is the principal object of his book.
When he speaks of “disengaging from the world about us” in order “to be in 
touch with ourselves” (1995: 123), or when he claims that the sound of traffic out-
side is “a world away,” he is using the more general cosmic implications of the word. 
But then, speaking of a moment of great personal intensity, he says, “It was not 
unlike the experience of watching someone you love dying—the same sense of the 
world falling away, of oneself falling away from the world, and of all one’s awareness 
condensed by pain into a black hole. At such times, the world at large is diminished 
and loses its hold, eclipsed by the viscerally immediate world of oneself. It is always 
a shock, going outdoors again after a birth or a death, to find that the world has not 
changed along with you, that it has gone on unaffected and indifferent” (1995: 135).
Here we find a kind of logical non sequitur: “the world falling away from us” is 
held to be the same as “us falling away from the world.” In fact, the error is only ap-
parent, because the “world at large” and the “visceral world” cannot quite come to 
separate from each other, they are held together by the fact that sociality and inten-
tional thinking are preconditions for propositional (reflexive) thinking. The world 
embraces to the extent that it places us—not in space, not in time—but in existence. 
There is, then, something external in world, for there is no way out of world, we are 
contained by it; but the world is also an openness, as we are recurrently “confronted 
9. This article’s reviewers argued that Emanuel Lévinas’ thought (much as Heidegger’s) is 
too divergent from my guiding inspiration in Donald Davidson’s philosophical world 
for it to be a useful reference. I found, however, that the late thinking of Davidson 
(2005) was in many ways compatible with Lévinas’ use of the concept of “alterity as 
anterior,” which so inspired me in discussing ethical issues (cf. Lévinas 1971).
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by the indeterminate relations between words and world” and our condition is not 
only to inhabit world but also to inhabit language. We are world-forming.
There would then be three angles to world that Jackson is manipulating without 
ever being willing to separate them, for he sees them as mutually constitutive: (a) 
the cosmic world; (b) the perspectival world; and (c) the propositional world. The 
central conclusion we take from our examination, however, is that personhood—
the fact that humans are propositionally thinking embodied creatures—is what 
holds together the complex dynamic between world and worlds.
Globalization
Let us now take another example in Ulf Hannerz’s reflections concerning the present 
situation of anthropology and his own personal trajectory within it. Anthropology’s 
world: Life in a twenty-first-century discipline (2010) takes a very different perspec-
tive on world from Jackson’s book, as it is less concerned with how people studied by 
anthropologists inhabit world, and more with anthropology as a mode of inhabit-
ing world. The focus is shifted toward the condition of being an anthropologist in 
a world that is becoming more . . . global. While never referring to Henri Lefebvre’s 
concept of mondialisation, Hannerz explores the way in which his condition as an 
anthropologist in the second half of the twentieth century was affected by this “shift 
from the nation-state to the world scale,” this process by which a new political and 
economic order emerged that followed on from the nation and the city, imposing 
new forms of domination, repression, and hegemony (cf. Elden 2004: 232–35).
His was the curiously contradictory life of someone who, never having left his 
own Swedish academic base (for he retired from the same department where he 
carried out his undergraduate studies)10 worked and dialogued with colleagues and 
informants all over the world and had a worldwide academic impact. However, he 
notes, his “cosmopolitan” condition, is two-sided: on one side, the worried face of 
someone who contemplates humanity as a whole and its evolving political turmoil 
(the scale of the mondial); and, on the other side, the happy face of the one who 
looks out on the fascinating diversity of meanings and meaningful forms in the hu-
man world (Hannerz 2010: 93).
There is an affinity between the two faces, he suggests, which is potentiated by 
anthropology’s main challenge, as he sees it, of “making the world transparent.” 
Now, transparency is a project of mediation between the two faces of the cosmo-
politan observer: the globalized condition can only remain humanly pleasing to 
the extent that pluralism survives. “The world of anthropology keeps changing” 
(2010: 1), he claims: for anthropologists, the global and the cosmopolitan are two 
manifestations of facing the contradictoriness of world’s becoming. We are tempted 
to refer here to Heidegger’s famous dictum: “The world never is, but worlds.” There-
fore, as I shall explore in the next article, I am tempted to read Hannerz’s transpar-
ency as a mode of worlding (cf. Tsing 2011 or Descola 2010).
10. I was privileged to be part of the fascinating retirement symposium that his colleagues 
organized, which brought out very vividly his lifework and its curiously understated 
creativity.
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In fact, in the very first page of his book, Hannerz outlines the nature of the apo-
ria that confronts him as he looks back at his life as a fieldworker (in Washington 
DC, the Caribbean, Nigeria, and among international reporters in Jerusalem, 
Johannesburg, and Tokyo). As it happens, he brings out the same three vectors 
that emerged from Jackson’s study: the cosmic vector—“anthropology’s world is the 
wider outside world”; the perspectival vector—“anthropology is a social world in 
itself ”; and the propositional vector—“it is a world anthropologists are inclined to 
think of as made up of a multitude of ‘fields.’” (Hannerz 2010:1)
As the book evolves, we see him turning time and again to a central quandary 
concerning the very definition of his discipline. In Sweden, his decision to become 
an anthropologist in the 1960s had involved a political conviction. That is why he 
had wanted to carry out research in Nigeria. The period was one of decolonization, 
and the young Hannerz’ burning wish, that turned him into a social scientist, was 
to understand that process and contribute actively toward it. He saw the internally 
turned volkskunde (folklore) type of academic engagement being carried out in the 
department next door as dubious and problematic. As he puts it, he wanted to be an 
“expatriate researcher,” not someone turned in onto the historicist preoccupations 
of a national/nationalist type of research engagement. So the opposition between 
“away” and “home” fieldwork engagements was formative.
However, as things evolved in the 1980s and 1990s, neocolonialism turned into 
neoimperialism, and the face that contemplated the global order (the mondial) be-
came sadder and sadder. His experiences in Nigeria, when he finally managed to 
get there, were particularly distressing. At the same time, anthropology’s other face 
also changed radically. There were departments of anthropology in most places 
where previously anthropologists had been expatriates and a new “anthropology at 
home” emerged that was as cosmopolitan as his own “away anthropology.” It could 
hardly be classified in the same bag as the earlier nationalist-driven research that he 
had avoided in the 1960s. By the early twenty-first century, studying international 
reporters, Hannerz himself was going everywhere, from interviewing a neighbor 
of his in Stockholm to Washington, Johannesburg, Jerusalem, or Tokyo. Thus, he 
calls for the need to retain the “awayness” of the anthropology of the past that he 
most cherishes, by preventing the new cosmopolitan anthropology from becoming 
at the global level what folklore had been at the national level. His aim is to retain 
“our part as anthropologists as helpers of a worldwide transparency, as men and 
women in the middle” (2010: 91).
It is worth confronting here the quotes of two anthropologists of the earlier 
generation that inspire him. In 1988, Clifford Geertz had declared, “the next neces-
sary thing is to enlarge the possibility of intelligible discourse between people quite 
different from one another . . . and yet contained in a world where, tumbled as they 
are into endless connection, it is increasingly difficult to get out of each other’s way” 
(quoted in Hannerz 2010: 88–89). Hannerz then quotes Fei Xiaodong who, in 1992, 
claimed that people “shaped by different cultures with different attitudes towards 
life are crowded into a small world in which they must live in complete and abso-
lute interdependence” (quoted in Hannerz 2010: 100).
This sense that, faced with the world’s increasing smallness, there is a burning 
need to build on the world’s plurality is what drives his efforts at passing on anthro-
pology to the next century. Between the cosmic and the perspectival dimensions of 
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world, anthropology would be a kind of propositional mediator that turns interior-
ity into exteriority and vice versa, thus preventing the global order from destroying 
the conditions for its own cosmopolitanism. Worlding is a task carried out by per-
sons who use the very means that turn them into persons (that is, propositionally 
thinking beings) into an instrument for the production of ever-wider bird’s-eye 
view effects (cf. Tomasello 2008).
A plurality of worlds
A number of arguments have emerged of late—some more coherent than oth-
ers—claiming that there are “worlds” or better still that there is “a plurality of 
ontologies.”11 The simpler form of the argument may be phrased in the following 
terms:
Rather than using our own analytical concepts to make sense of a given 
ethnography (explanation, interpretation), we use the ethnography to 
rethink our analytical concepts. Rather than asking why the Nuer should 
think that twins are birds, we should be asking how we need to think 
of twins and birds (and all their relevant corollaries, such as humanity, 
siblinghood, animality, flight or what have you) in order to arrive at a 
position from which the claim that twins are birds no longer registers 
as an absurdity. What must twins be, what must birds be, et cetera? 
(Holbraad 2010: 184)
Thus formulated, the argument is immediately unacceptable due to its blatant ahis-
toricism and to the presupposition that “us” is a geopolitically recognizable vantage 
point. One must ask the author how he accounts historically for the fact that he 
reads ethnographies; how Evans-Pritchard actually managed to fall through the 
trappings of “our” world to enter into “the Nuer world,” only to come out again at 
the end; one must try very hard not to remember that Collingwood’s theory of his-
tory ([1946] 2005) was quite as influential to Evans-Pritchard’s formulations con-
cerning the Nuer as were the Nuer themselves; and, finally, why Nuer ethnography 
is the author’s chosen example.
There are, however, other versions of the argument. These claim that we must 
“not see ethnography as a kind of translation from one worldview to another,” 
that “all ontologies are ‘groundless’ in the sense that no one is the True Ontology” 
(Paleček and Risjord 2013: 10, 16). In their essay, Martin Paleček and Mark Risjord 
revisit Davidson’s injunction that we ought to reject the dualism between scheme 
and content, attempting to adapt his nonrepresentationism to anthropology 
11. Perhaps this is no more than “a certain (and thus unavoidably fading) moment in the 
recent history of the discipline, where a vaguely defined cohort of mostly Cambridge-
associated scholars found it exciting to experiment with the nature of ethnographic 
description and anthropological theorizing in a certain way,” as Morten Pedersen puts 
it (2012), but if that is so and Martin Holbraad’s intention amounts to little more than 
ironic conservative posturing, then all the theses and books that are monthly being 
produced in its wake make little sense. I propose that Pedersen’s explanations are, in 
fact, less convincing than the original posture.
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(Davidson 1984: 183–98).12 This is a laudable exercise. Unfortunately, together with 
most of their colleagues of this inspiration, the authors’ use of the word “ontology” 
depends on a slide in meaning concerning world that bedevils all their successive 
arguments. Contrary to what the authors believe, the adoption of ontological mo-
nism does not imply the claim that one can have access to the one-and-only True 
Ontology. Ontological monism does not postulate that truth lies beyond the realm 
of human experience but rather that truth is a foundational feature of thinking: 
“without the idea of truth we would not be thinking creatures, nor would we un-
derstand what it is for someone else to be a thinking creature” (Davidson 2005: 16).
That apart, we have a problem: anthropologists are so used to looking at eth-
nography as translation, in the old Evans-Pritchardian manner, that we have 
stopped thinking whether that is really a useful metaphor (cf. Beidelman 1971; 
Pina-Cabral 1992). What do ethnographers do precisely? Now, skeptical relativ-
ism is buried so deep into the tissue of our anthropological language that we find 
it hard to give an account of ethnography that bypasses the problems raised by 
representationalist theories of thinking (cf. Chemero 2009). Paleček and Risjord 
are correct in trying to go beyond this, but they go on to argue that “Davidson’s 
later work can be used to scaffold the inference from a rejection of the scheme-
content distinction to a pluralism of ontology” (2013: 16). Yet this is an incorrect 
assumption: Davidson is absolutely explicit about the fact that there is only one 
single ontology (there is only one world) and his dialogue with Spinoza at the 
end of his life is precisely an elaboration on that idea (2005: 295–314). To at-
tempt to salvage the metaphysical nature of Viveiros de Castro’s perspectivism 
(his Métaphysique cannibale [2009]) by twisting Davidson’s positions is plainly a 
misguided step.
The discussion, however, cannot simply be left at that. From the indubitable 
observation that there is evidence for the existence of distinct “webs of inter-
pretation” that apply in different historical contexts, the authors conclude that 
“ontologies” exist and are incommensurable. According to them, ontologies are 
“the product of human interpretive interactions with one another and with their 
environments. These interactions are often very different, constituting different 
ontologies. They are incommensurable in the sense that no one way of engaging 
the environment is right or wrong in metaphysical terms” (Paleček and Risjord 
2013: 16). I honestly can see no difference between this definition of the word “on-
tology” and the meaning traditionally attributed to the anthropological concept of 
“worldview,” apart from the fact, of course, that the word “ontology” is tinted with 
a spirit of idealism (a métaphysique) and the word “worldview” is not (because it 
presumes its own plural, implying that, if there are differing perspectives, then 
there is one world).
This matter of “incommensurability,” in fact, has a very long history, particu-
larly by reference to Thomas S. Khun’s argument about scientific revolutions. In his 
later life, Khun himself took to criticizing the excessively relativist interpretations 
of his argument (1962, 1983). In his survey of the debate, Philip Kitcher finds that 
12. To my mind, to the contrary, Maurice Bloch’s refusal to abandon an intellectualist mod-
el of mind in his otherwise interesting book on the challenge of cognition reduces its 
relevance (2012).
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Khun’s earlier claims of incommensurability were interpreted too literally and that 
“we can revert to the idea that full communication across the revolutionary divide 
is possible and that rival claimants can appeal to a shared body of observational 
evidence” (Kitcher 1982: 690). The conceptual incommensurability that divides 
scientific paradigms turns out to be just like that which divides languages that are 
subject to translation—but always only partly due to the limits imposed by the 
indeterminacy of all communication. Kitcher’s reading of the late Khun’s take on 
incommensurability carefully avoids the all-or-nothing fallacy, arguing that most 
of Khun’s readers go too readily to irrationalist conclusions that are essentially con-
servative and are, in any case, unnecessary in order to interpret the historical evi-
dence presented by scientific revolutions.
In the same line, I espouse Davidson’s claim that there are no radically in-
compatible human worlds because all humans are endowed with the possibility 
of developing intelligent communication with all other humans (bar exceptional 
circumstances: e.g., insanity, drunkenness, extreme fear, etc., and I am not lim-
iting myself to linguistic communication). Since all our thinking is based on 
intentional thinking as much as on propositional thinking, radical ontological 
breaks are inconceivable. We are historically part of the world. To claim other-
wise would be tantamount to saying that ethnography is an impossibility since, in 
order to learn what other humans think, we first have to engage with them as hu-
man and, more than that, as humans cohabiting a recognizable world, as we saw 
Jackson arguing earlier. Without the triangulation of the world there is no place 
for communication.13
Paleček and Risjord formulate this aspect of Davidson’s thought in the follow-
ing terms: “Insofar as we are not able to separate our knowledge of the object from 
the object itself, we are not able to separate our knowledge of ourselves from the 
knowledge of others. The interpreter becomes a crucial aspect of what it means 
to have thoughts” (2013: 12). From this, then, they proceed: “The ethnographer 
is engaging not just an individual in one-on-one communication but a whole in-
terpretive community” (14). Surely that is an important point—quite as important 
as its symmetrical point: the critique of ethnographic exceptionalism. That is, in 
engaging the ethnographer, the peoples of the world that were being subjected 
to imperialism throughout the modern era, were not only engaging an individu-
al in a one-on-one communication, but were engaging the full force of imperial 
globalization.
Now, it would seem that, if there are “interpretive communities,” there are 
“worldviews,” that is, that which differentiate interpretive communities in face of 
others. Of course, it may well be argued that these should not be seen as “views,” 
for that would be to cede to representationism and to an unjustifiably strong form 
of realism. Philippe Descola has recently produced a formulation of our relation 
to world where he tries to argue just this (to have the cake and eat it, so to speak). 
13. I insist, there is in this argument no claim that the borders of humanity with other 
animals are precise nor that human proneness to communication cannot elicit forms 
of communication with animals that often approach interhuman communication. As 
Heidegger would have it, intentional thinking in both humans and animals presup-
poses world, but a poor world (1995).
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He adopts a kind of minimalist realism such as I have been defending in my own 
writings since the early 2000s, but then he appends to it a critique of the notion of 
worldview:
There can be no multiple worlds because it is highly probable that the 
potential qualities and relations afforded to human cognition and 
enactment are the same everywhere until some have been detected and 
actualized, others ignored. But once this worlding process has been 
achieved, the result is not a world-view, i.e., one version among others 
of the same transcendental reality; the result is a world in its own right, 
a system of partially actualized properties, saturated with meaning and 
replete with agency, but partially overlapping with other similar systems 
that have been differently actualized and instituted by different persons. 
(Descola 2010: 339)
Here, Descola is right concerning the minimal realism but is wrong concern-
ing the worldview issue, since he is unwittingly engaging in the all-or-nothing 
fallacy again. He is assuming (à la Paleček and Risjord) that the alternative to a 
multiple ontologies posture is a one-and-only True Ontology posture. His op-
tion of denying that when humans share worldviews they are essentially engag-
ing a historically common world is ahistoricist and feeds into the primitivist 
strain in anthropological thinking that engages in what Hammel long ago used 
to criticize as “one-village-one-vote comparativism” (1984: 29–43). Furthermore, 
there is human exclusivism in this, because it is reducing world to propositional 
thinking (and to conscious categorical thinking at that). But world in humans 
is grounded in the sort of intentional thinking that we share with animals; scaf-
folded thinking only comes after and above that and, as we have argued already, 
it is in any case rooted in our common human embodiment. Too many decades 
of unchallenged interpretativism have led anthropologists to assume implicitly 
that thought is primarily systemic in a culturalist sort of way and, therefore, that 
there are “worlds.”
But the ethnographer in the field is not engaging an interpretive community, 
she is engaging singular humans or, if we want to see it in time, a number of 
singular persons. Now that is of the essence, for it is due to her human sense of 
coresponsibility (her proneness to shared intentionality—cf. Tomasello 2008) that 
the ethnographer can achieve communication through interpretive charity, never 
through any sort of person-to-group communication. In short, I may communi-
cate with a number of different persons at the same time, but I can only commu-
nicate with them because they are singular humans (persons in ontogenesis) like 
me. To forget that is to allow ourselves to slip back into Durkheimian sociocen-
trism or worse.
Therefore, we are here faced with another version of the quandary that the 
anthropology of kinship has been intensely addressing for a number of years:14 
there is a constant dynamic oscillation between singularity and duality in the con-
struction of the dividual person. The unquestioned use of the word “individual” 
by authors such as Paleček and Risjord actually carries implications of which they 
14. See Marriott 1976; Strathern 1988; Sahlins 2011a, 2011b; Pina-Cabral 2013a and 2013b.
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might not be aware, for it assumes too casually the unitariness of personhood.15 
That unitariness is precisely what gives credence to ethnographic exceptionalism 
(that is, the image of the lone ethnographer faced with the whole of the tribe in 
front of her tape recorder and then coming back to “us” speaking out the words of 
the “tribe” and not of the persons in it—explaining why twins can be birds or why 
blood is beer to jaguars, to use the more tired examples). But what we have learned 
from the long history of the debate about personhood and kinship is that singu-
larity and plurality imply each other in relations of mutuality (Strathern 1988: 
11–14; Pina-Cabral 2013b). Therefore, the ethnographer who is carrying out her 
task is permanently oscillating between plurality and singularity in a process of 
ontogeny—she can only access interpretive communities because she engages sin-
gular communicators and she can only engage the latter because she is willing 
to enter into their interpretive communities. Again, we are faced with the hege-
monic strength of the all-or-nothing fallacy. There is no matter of True Ontology 
as much as there is no matter in denying the veridicality of all ontologies. The 
notion of a truth that can exist outside of human interaction in history is absurd. 
Truth is a feature of mind and “mind is a function of the whole person constituted 
over time in intersubjective relations with others in the environing world” (Toren 
2002: 122).
Thus, yes, there is only one world but, yes, there are interpretive communities. 
If these were truly incommensurable then there would be no ethnography. But the 
contrary is also the case: as no communication can happen outside the indetermi-
nacy of meaning, the question of commensurability is always relative from the start 
and cannot ever be anything but relative.
Conclusion
Having examined the way in which the word “world” is used by anthropologists, 
I conclude that the meanings attributed to it reflect a basic tension between being 
of the world and being in the world. In turn, this tension operates along three basic 
vectors: for each embodied person, (iii) the world in its materiality opposes itself to 
propositional thinking due to (ii) the constant constitution of perspectival centers 
(home/self); in turn, the evanescent nature of these centers allows for (i) a constant 
play between the world as an embracing cosmos and the world as a locally pro-
duced context. Personhood (propositionally thinking human beings historically 
engaged in sociality) is what allows for the three vectors of polarization to come 
together in a broad category of world.
The world is one because, in personhood, alterity is anterior; as phenomenol-
ogy has taught us, human experience is social before it is rational. The world, in all 
of its plurality, cannot escape from history; all those untold historical determina-
tions that accumulate in the single act of any singular person. There is freedom in 
personhood to the extent that propositional thought institutes its own processes 
15. An aspect that Maurice Bloch’s “blob” unfortunately also does not manage to bypass 
(2012).
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of determination that accumulate over material determination; because of what 
Davidson called “the anomaly.”
World, therefore, like persons, will ever waver in the unstable terrain that lies 
between singularity and plurality; it is one and it is many. In part 2 of this article 
I will examine what are the structural conditions of world and how ethnography 
may best approach them in the light of the transcendentalist strains that have ever 
accompanied anthropology since it became an academic discipline.
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Monde: Une exploration anthropologique.
Résumé : Les anthropologues ont souvent recours au mot « monde » comme si 
son sens allait de soi. Le mot reste cependant très ambivalent, et sa signification 
dangereusement polysémique. « Quel monde ? » doit-on se demander, ce qui mène 
à une autre question importante: y a-t-il« des mondes » ? Cette interrogation nous 
oblige à confronter certaines des perplexités fondamentales qui ont hanté la théorie 
anthropologique tout au long du siècle dernier. Dans cet article en deux parties, 
je propose d’abandonner la dichotomie établie entre les formes assez grossières 
de réalisme matérialiste et les formes tout aussi rudimentaires d’idéalisme sémio-
tique. Je soutiens que nous ne pouvons pas discuter du monde sans tenir compte du 
« pour qui », mais que cela est compatible avec l’ontologie d’un monde unique si l’on 
prend en compte le rôle de la personnalité dans la condition humaine. Le premier 
article plaide pour une ontologie du monde unique et la centralité de la personne. 
Il explore les implications d’une forme de réalisme minimal qui convient mieux à 
la posture ethnographique, tandis que le deuxième article répondra à la question de 
la formation du monde, et de la vision du monde.
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